From SAS to Blood Diamond Wars Page 11

  I went with the Chief to the Sierra Leone border, crossed the Mano bridge, and that was when he introduced me to all the head men of the CDF: Tamaboros, Donsos, Kapras, Kamajors. And his words to them that day were, ‘This is Fred, he is an ex-British army soldier. Fred is not a friend, Fred is a brother.’ I was very well received, and after shaking hands with everyone present, sat down next to the Chief, and straight away, the meeting started.

  Their plan was to build a Civil Defence Forces base in Sierra Leone, close to the Liberian border. They chose their spot, and over the course of a few days, they cleared the area and occupied it. They took over a house and made it into an office and a medical room. Next stage was the base for the men, but out of view from the Liberian side. Group locations were sited and sentry posts were prepared. Slightly deeper into the country, they cleared an area where a helicopter could land, without it being seen from the Liberian side. There they cached their heavy weapons and mortars. These were weapons that the Kamajors had captured from the RUF in the past, for as yet they had received no weapons from Sandline. The light weapons totalled about a hundred old, poor-quality to start with AK-47s. These they cannibalized into 87 working weapons. Fred loaded them, but he felt that in any professional army they would have been drilled and discarded as useless.

  Based as they were in the east of the country, hunter militias could attack military posts in the area, control the Mano river bridge until the AFRC counterattacked, or they could set up roadblocks; but they lacked the logistics to carry a war against the bulk of the AFRC/RUF in Freetown: they had to have a large base situated to the west. Their first step in that direction came thanks to the intelligence network that Hinga Norman initiated. Further reconnaissance confirmed a site for what was to become know as Base Zero. It was in the swamp area of the wetlands, but high enough to establish accommodation for a large number of fighters. All approaches to it were recced, and security was sited out of view. Cut-offs were planned and personnel to man them were selected.

  Hinga Norman knew what he wanted to achieve and he went about it with drive, energy and insight. His turning a deaf ear to his President’s injunctions on where to base himself went unchallenged. Kabbah may have been accused of being naïve about irregular warfare, or ingenuous in his trust of rebels or mutineers, but he had the political nous to realize that he needed a man like Hinga Norman in his government to do what one else seemed capable of taking on. So he set up a method of keeping in touch with his Deputy Minister of Defence through a three-way telephone conference on set occasions, at 6am US Eastern Standard time, with the Rev Alfred SamForay, Secretary-General of SLAM-CDF, Hinga Norman and the President.20

  These sessions were of mixed benefit to Hinga Norman: on the one hand he had his President’s backing; on the other, Kabbah’s lack of understanding of what could be achieved and within what timescale, produced tension. For example, the President advocated a Kamajor assault on Freetown within months of the coup, whereas, Hinga Norman believed that it required both a Sierra Leone militia and ECOMOG forces to oust the AFRC. He had discussions with ECOMOG’s Chief of Staff in Liberia, General Aziz Mohamed, who agreed with him. For that to happen, there had to be the agreement of ECOWAS, and there also had to be the logistical support to achieve it.

  The coup had taken place in May, and by October, Sandline had no personnel on the ground apart from Fred; and he was starting to find that there was a limit to his usefulness in the situation. Then, overnight, all that changed dramatically when he met a pilot friend from EO days.

  Part III

  Chapter Six

  Bokkie

  O, for a horse with wings!

  William Shakespeare, Cymbeline

  Enter, flared up at fast speed, tail just off the ground, a warhorse of an Mi-17 called Bokkie. In the annals of warfare, when man’s dependence on animal or machine has later been eulogized in verse or on film (from the gallant steed Roland, carrying good news for Aix, to the WWII bomber Memphis Belle) the helicopter Bokkie deserves to be ranked. Bokkie, the sole aircraft ferrying food, matériel and personnel to Sierra Leone’s battle zone, responded to all that was asked of it, and performed far beyond its design specifications.

  Bokkie was flown to Sierra Leone in 1995 by Executive Outcomes; it got its name – the affectionate diminutive of springbok – from EO pilot, Christoffel (Chris) Louw, who painted it on the fuselage. The helicopter remained at Lungi airport after Executive Outcomes departed the country, was guarded by ECOMOG after the coup, and was taken over by Sandline and leased to Roger Crooks (manager of the Mammy Yoko hotel and entrepreneur with several business interests) for a while until it was flown to Monrovia, Liberia by an outstanding South African pilot who had served in EO, Johann (Juba) Joubert. And here, from October onwards it was to provide a vital air bridge from the ECOMOG base at Monrovia to the force’s main base at Lungi, its subsidiary enclaves and Base Zero of the CDF.

  Successful though ECOMOG’s military intervention had been in Liberia, it required western countries to provide the necessary logistics. Although the constituent countries that comprised the force provided their own arms, ammunition and transport, it was the US State Department that contracted the private company, Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE), to provide air logistical support for the force’s operations in Liberia.1 Some of PAE’s personnel were ex-US Special Forces.

  ECOMOG’s presence in Sierra Leone had originally been as support and a bulwark for the country’s military against the possibility of a resurgent RUF, so its presence had been that of a friendly ally. But now, of course, all that had changed with the military coup: to the AFRC it was a hostile, foreign force. Yet to the Sierra Leone government in exile it was essential to sustain the force in the country; to Nigeria it was crucial that these bases remain so they could become possible launch pads for military action against the junta. Therefore, the ECOMOG battalion and the bases of its CDF allies had to be kept maintained, resupplied and reinforced; and Juba Incorporated was contracted to do it.

  Thus Bokkie came back into service with a private military company, and turned out to be not only a springbok but a true warhorse. Its new international crew of three had all served with Executive Outcomes: a South African pilot, Juba Joubert , an Ethiopian engineer, Sendaba Meri and a Fijian ex SAS loadmaster and gunner. As far as Fred was concerned, his change of role from ground warfare to aerial support was made effortlessly; he had been in a unit that was, after all, called the Special Air Service, whose capabilities since the Second World War included, ‘infiltration … by land, sea or air according to circumstances and training in all methods will be carried out.’2

  Juba had joined the South African Air Force in 1979 for 10 years and in that time he mainly flew helicopters operationally during the conflicts in and around South Africa and then during the South West Africa/Angolan war. For the last part of his time in the SAAF he did an instructor course and gave instruction on fixed winged aircraft. After that he joined the Bophuthatswana Air Force and was an instructor on helicopters and fixed wing aircraft before joining Executive Outcomes in 1993. So by the time he was with the Air Wing of Executive Outcomes he was a very experienced pilot. After he left Sierra Leone in December 1996, he gained more experience, flying in some conflict countries across the world until just after the 25 May coup in Sierra Leone, when he was flown in by a private consortium to help with the evacuation of mining and security personnel. However, for political reasons it fell through. He then was asked by Rodger Crooks to fly Bokkie from Lungi to Monrovia to carry out contract work for the UN in connection with the presidential elections. This too failed to materialize.

  Fred had first met him in Freetown when he joined EO. They got on well from the outset, and Juba made him feel at home with the group. When Fred had some free time between EO operations, Juba used to take him on flights to Kono, or wherever, tree-hopping and rolling as they flew over or near any villages – a practice that was developed fighting wars in southern Africa. The engineer, Sendaba
, was very well qualified: he had been an officer in the Ethiopian Air Force, and had been trained in Russia and was a fluent Russian speaker. He joined EO as an engineer after Fred began with the company. All three bonded together, and over time they all developed great affection for Bokkie.

  As Bokkie had been on the ground at Lungi since about February, Juba and Sendaba had to get it serviceable for contract work; and this was at a time when ECOMOG had urgent need of a helicopter to support them in the Sierra Leone conflict. None of the other operators in Monrovia was prepared to take on the job due to its dangerous nature. So Juba Inc was accepted, and contracted with ECOMOG on the 8th October 1997.

  If there was any lingering question mark at ECOMOG HQ in Monrovia about the degree of commitment that might be expected of the three ‘civilian’ contractors, it was obliterated at a stroke with their first important mission. On the afternoon of 11 October, the HQ operations officer came rushing into the building which housed stores for transportation and asked Juba if they could fly an emergency resupply of ammunition to an ECOMOG Company at Kenema, which, logistically, had been cut off for three months, and evacuate three wounded soldiers. There had been a sustained attack on the post that had gone on for two days. If the troops were not resupplied with ammunition, the position could possibly fall that very evening when the enemy attacked again. The attackers probably knew from the defenders’ response that ammunition must be short all round, so they would press home their assault. Juba asked the Ops officer to leave them to discuss the mission first and he would come back to him shortly with a yes or no.

  After the Ops officer had gone, Juba asked Sendaba what he thought. Sendaba smiled, and said that it was up to Juba, the pilot, to make the decision. Juba put the question to Fred, who said, ‘Juba, you’re the pilot. If you’re happy with it, let us do it, for those guys need our help.’ Juba looked at them, paused, reflected a moment, and said that if they were to carry out the operation successfully, they would have written their names, and Bokkie’s, into the history of the conflict, and gained the thanks of the ECOMOG headshed (headquarters). There was no demur. So he asked Sendaba to get Bokkie ready, and Fred to supervise the loading of the ammunition, while he went for his brief.

  He was not away long. And when he, in turn,− was briefing them, all three felt the excitement and the apprehension of flying into the unknown. The ECOMOG troops were surrounded; to make matters worse, their base, a Lebanese school (for children of the Lebanese community working in the diamond industry) was overlooked by high ground. It would be very risky, especially if the enemy had heavy weapons on the hillside, so it was up to Fred to try and locate enemy positions and make them keep their heads down while they made their run in. Fred, of course, needed more than his AK-47 for helicopter duties, and he had been issued with a General Purpose Machine Gun (GPMG), a weapon he was familiar with from SAS days. Juba explained that they would make only one pass over the site to select the best spot on which to put down. He used a telling image to describe the awareness of being under small arms fire: ‘You’ll know you’re being shot at when you hear the typewriter keys starting to tap outside.’

  They got airborne from Roberts International airport, Monrovia. It was still during the rainy season, but the weather did not look like a real problem initially and the routing to target was 55 minutes, which gave them an estimated time of arrival over target of 16.00 hours local time − as arranged with the base at Kenema. Bokkie got airborne at maximum, all-up weight, due to the heavy load, and after about 20 minutes dark clouds became visible en route, pushing in from the west. This forced them to go further north to see if they could fly around it, but at 40 minutes into their flight, Juba realized it was a serious squall reaching into Guinea. He therefore decided to return to ECOMOG HQ , Monrovia and wait to see if they could get through the next day. After landing, when Juba went to Operations to debrief on the mission, he was informed that the Kenema base had been attacked by junta forces at exactly 16.00 hours. So it was clear that there had been an information leak. What was not clear, however, was where and how it was done, but Juba decided that the time over target the following day would only be revealed just prior to take-off, to cut the time for enemy reaction, if the message were intercepted.

  Next day the weather was fine, and their flight overland was uneventful. The count down to the target was calmly and meticulously done, and they made their sweep over the location. Fred was keyed up, scanning the hillside for enemy positions; but in the interim, the junta forces seem to have lain back, relaxing, biding their time before their next assault, and so were taken by surprise. But the aircrew could also see no sign of the ECOMOG troops. From the air the site looked like a scene out of a Western: a smoking canvas shelter, burnt out buildings and no sign of life. However, when Juba wheeled Bokkie round at the back of the school, Fred saw figures in green waving, and Juba saw them at the same time. Swiftly Juba selected where he would bring Bokkie down, and in they went, landing facing down hill, rotor blades barely clearing the ground. Touch down was expertly judged. The next moment all hell broke loose. Small arms fire started, followed by a big bang that was probably a 105mm canon. It was not clear who was shooting, where they were shooting from, and what they were shooting at. But Juba decided he was not going to get airborne before the cargo had been offloaded.

  Fred jumped down, opened the clam-like back door, climbed back in and started dragging the boxes of their 3.5 ton load of ammunition, food and medical supplies to the door. At first there was confusion with a lot of shooting and some troops jumped onboard, thinking they were getting evacuated. Then, though, soldiers were detailed to unload and ferry the ammunition from the helicopter; they were tense and excited when they ran up. Fred jumped down, heaving the ammunition boxes on to the earth. Next he climbed back inside and received the three casualties; then he sprang down again and closed the back door, only to find that the Nigerians had unloaded his GPMG. He had to leap down once more, pick up his weapon, then back into the helicopter, and they took off. The enemy gunners – and it was now clear who was firing – were having a golden opportunity and took full advantage of it. As Bokkie rose into the air, Fred raked their firing points with his GPMG; Juba flew Bokkie out of the battle zone, skilfully and tactically, since he was familiar with the area from his EO days.

  Back at ECOMOG HQ Monrovia, news had already been radioed to them that the mission was successful; and when Bokkie landed, senior officers came out to congratulate the aircrew. By that afternoon’s work, they had proved themselves to the ECOMOG hierarchy, just as Juba had anticipated. However, there had been one tragic element to the operation that the crew only then learned about. On the sloping ground where Juba put Bokkie down, during the scramble of unloading and ferrying, one of the soldiers carrying a box of ammunition, tense because they were in the enemy’s field of fire, lost concentration on his immediate environment and had walked into the rear tail rotor and died instantly. The aircrew were not aware of it when they were under fire. But when Sendaba inspected the rear rotor, he confirmed that the tail rotor blade tips were damaged. Juba tried to get some tips from the CIS (a Russian company) crews but they were not suitable for Bokkie’s blades. ECOMOG engineers, however, quite swiftly, managed to provide alternative rotor blade tips out of ammunition boxes; the crew fitted them, and test-flew the helicopter. Bokkie was back in service.

  The net result of that operation was that senior officers knew that this crew could be relied on to fly anywhere, whenever they were needed. And so on 17 October, Lt Col S A Folorunsho, at HQ Monrovia, signed Fred’s authorization, certifying that he was working with ECOMOG as helicopter crew, and requested all relevant individuals to co-operate with him.3

  Requests and requirements multiplied as the conflict on the ground continued: conflict between the AFRC junta and ECOMOG troops, and between junta forces and Kamajors. The Juba Incorporated team operated out of Monrovia along with the other private company, PAE, which provided air logistics for ECOMOG – but not i
nto Sierra Leone. Having already been there for a year, PAE with two Mi-8 MTVs and an Mi-26, had a more favourable site. Bokkie was parked in an open space adjacent to the ECOMOG HQ. This was where all the stores for transportation were loaded. About 500 metres away was the Monrovia Power station; power lines radiated out from it; and the open space where Bokkie stood was, in fact, within the compound of the power station. Fifty metres away in one direction the compound’s perimeter wall faced them; about sixty metres in the other direction a power line cut across their flight path. The problem for Juba, in this confined location, was to get enough lift, by using the helicopter’s in-ground effect, to clear these obstacles.

  Finding the optimum method and maximum payload was a case of trial and near error. Once or twice they were close to writing off Bokkie, but Juba’s experience and skill came into play. The pattern they developed was: ensure they had as little of the helicopter’s fuel in the tank as possible; load up with the maximum payload they could carry to clear the obstacles; fly the 2 kilometres to Spriggs airfield; fill up with fuel, and take on more of a cargo load; and then, using the runway to gain transition while still on the ground, they took off like a fixed wing aircraft. They learned that 13 drums of fuel were the maximum they could load at the ECOMOG store and get clear of the compound. On a few occasions, the helicopter’s payload was so heavy, and beyond the aircraft’s limits, that Juba had to back up as far as possible, select emergency power on the augmentation levers and fly the aircraft forward using maximum power, building up as much airspeed as possible just above the ground. Take off was a risky venture. As Bokkie would hit transition speed and lose height, Juba would level her platform, then use the struts of the helicopter to bounce the aircraft off all 3 wheels, increasing the pressure on the ground cushion, and spring-boarding up at the last moment to get as much upward force as possible to gain height and clear the power line that stretched across their flight path.